Immersion 20: some remarks for Alex

Alex Reuneker has published some of his writings on immersion at his blog (www.reuneker.com/blog) I cannot recommend his writings enough, to anyone interested in the subject of immersion or media-theory. However, I find that some relevant questions, posed by Alex, remain to be answered.

I will try to formulate an answer to one of the questions in this small article.

Alex touches the sensitive and difficult topic regarding the symbiosis between technology and immersion, on which the main question would be something like this: does the involvement of modern technology, used to add lifelikeliness or more persistency to the mimesis, necessary or probably improve on the quality or grade of immersion in a viewer?
To phrase this question in the form of an example: does a movie in 3d necessary impose more or better immersion on a viewer than the same movie in 2d? Or: Does the holodeck on the Starship Enterprise, programmed to play a scene of the ‘Chants de Maldoror’ impose more or better immersion than a paper copy of the book by Isidore Ducasse?

My answer to these questions would be: no.

Apparently, the consensus in the books, on which Alex bases his texts, would be, that modern technology indeed improves on immersion. The writers of these books might or might not have themselves allowed to be blinded by the joys and wonders of recent developents in technology, or the bright promises of future endeavours and predictions in science fiction, or they might be handicapped by their somewhat limited (sometimes even embarassing) understanding on the subject of immersion. Anyhow, I believe Alex agrees with me in my rejection of technology as necessary on the improvement of representations and their enhanced adequacy on imposing immersion on a viewer. But I think his argumentation augmenting this rejection lacks immediacy.

Alex: "Janet Murray thus defines immersion as the sensation of being surrounded by another reality that feeds our whole perception. (..) In her view, digital media will become as explorable and extensive as the ‘real’ world and it is this view that determines her explanation of immersion. (..) She thinks it is essential that the medium itself disappears from our perception. The boundary between what is represented and what is physically present fades and eventually disappears."
Alex' counterargument is the notion that the physical aspects of the representation will always be there, in the form of real world objects (technological equipment) or instrumental media-related obligations to the viewer, that are not part of the mimesis. (interactions) Alex thus emphasizes the impossibility of Murray's theory.

Let us give the propositions by Murray some more thought.
Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as’ is only valid on the subject if it is used to illustrate Wollheim’s response or addition to ‘seeing-as’ which is ‘seeing-in’. Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ is relevant to the discussion because it somewhat demystifies the relation between matter and representation. According to Wollheim, a blob of red paint on a painting is matter, (seeing-as) the same blob on the same painting can also be a red roof on an old barn in the country, which makes it representation. (seeing-in) A 3d videodevice to be placed on a volunteer’s head is matter, the 3d movie shown with it, is representation. According to Wollheim, it is not possible to see both at the same time, meaning that the technology and the representation can never interfere, even if one or the other is prominently there. The abundance of technological equipment can therefore never influence the immersion. Although the principle of ‘seeing-in’ by Wollheim is an enduring subject of polemization, I believe that in this particular case the argument stands firm.

The main characteristics of a representation are, at first:
The represented world is NOT really happening. Representations do not make believe that the represented world is really happening. To make it appear more true does not change the fact that it isn’t true. I believe there cannot be immersion in a viewer if the represented is really happening, because a really happening representation cannot exist. Projecting a scene out of the ‘Chants the Maldodor’ in the holodeck of the Enterprise perhaps makes it easier to believe that the representation is really happening, (I’m not even sure that is true..) but the immediate fact remains that it is not. If it was, it would be reality. If a viewer believes, even for one moment, that the represented world is really happening, than there can be no immersion. The immersed person needs to know that the represented world is not really happening, and needs to keep that in mind during his state of immersion. He needs to feel ‘safe’. This vital characteristic of a representation is directly opposed to the use of technology to enhance the representation into an almost lifelike mimesis, during which the immersed person might not feel ‘safe’ anymore. This is one reason for my rejection of lifelike enhancements of representations to obtain more immersion on a viewer. Secondly, immersion takes place in a viewer’s head, triggered by a mimesis. Goal of the mimesis is to cause immersion. One has to believe that there is a story to tell, that the story has a certain amount of rules, one has to believe that these rules or requirements in storytelling have been met. Obeying the rules of the medium or the story is of great importance and cannot be underestimated, but the lifelikeliness of the representation is not. It is possible to picture a mimesis which contains no lifelikeliness at all, but nevertheless is succesfull in immersing a viewer, because the mental rules of storytelling in the mimesis are met, in relation to the subjective characteristics of the medium at hand.

That is why I believe Murray does not have sufficient grasp of the concept of immersion.

I will address more of Alex's writings in future posts.